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Abstract 
 
The INSPIRE Directive, a European Union Directive to promote change in the 
use and re-use of geospatial information in all European member states,  is 
indirectly and implicitly assuming new forms of cooperation between public 
authorities, and assuming non-problematic networking and cooperation between 
public authorities. Empirical evidence from public administration science is 
however showing that cooperation is a frequently researched and loaded term 
and that changing existing forms, or introducing new forms of public sector 
cooperation, has often proven to be problematic. This article investigates for 
three cases in the Netherlands how political-organizational motives may play a 
role in the cooperation with geographic information and communication 
technology (geoICT). In the analysis, the assumption is that individual 
organizations operate in a dynamic arena of interests and influences, which have 
an impact in decisions and behaviour within the cooperation. The analysis itself 
applies an analytical approach, whereby for each case a selected set of political-
organizational notions are compared. These notions include: authority, interest, 
command, control and coordination. The cases chosen are different in the degree 
to which INSPIRE objectives play a direct role, or a less direct role. The data was 
collected through qualitative research techniques. The investigation shows that 
the political-organizational context in which INSPIRE needs to be adopted has a 
direct impact on the degree of its acceptance. Common in the cases is the 
increase of operational agreements, which trigger an increase of alternative 
structures. These alternatives are legitimized by other policies and directives.  
The consequence for INSPIRE implementation is that if these political-
organizational motives are not taken into account appropriately, the unintended 
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and often hidden counter-effects may hamper the overall implementation of the 
INSPIRE Directive.  A possible next phase of the research would need to validate 
the results by investigating the cases more longitudinally, and by comparing with 
other cases, both in the Netherlands and Europe.   
 
Keywords: inter-organizational cooperation, geoICT, governance, G2G 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Why is it that some projects, systems and/ or regulations seem to fail, while 
others seem to succeed, even when the designs for both are similar or practically 
the same? Is it because of something that we overlooked in the process, even if 
we could have known it, or it is because something was hidden or we didn’t want 
to see it, or is it because originally we didn’t look in the proper way? We should 
pose these questions when evaluating if a particular agent of change is, was or 
will be successful in different organizational and political contexts in which the 
change is anticipated. In this article a European Union promoted change in the 
use and re-use of geospatial information, INSPIRE, is compared to the actual 
implemented change within organizations in the Netherlands. The instrument of 
this change, the INSPIRE Directive (European Commission, 2007), requires 
every member country to comply to harmonised rules of  production, use, and re-
use of spatial information and spatial information technology in the public sector. 
For simplicity, the “production, use, and re-use of spatial information and spatial 
information technology” will be equated with geo-information information and 
communication technology, “geoICT”, so INSPIRE is considered a Directive to 
harmonize geoICT in the public sector. Despite this principal objective, INSPIRE 
aims, indirectly and implicitly, at new forms of cooperation between public 
authorities, and is thereby implicitly assuming that national contact points or 
authorities can steer INSPIRE implementation through non-problematic 
networking and effective cooperation between public authorities at all sub-
national levels. Cooperation is however a frequently researched and loaded term 
in public administration science, and empirical evidence from that domain is 
showing that changing existing forms or introducing new forms of public sector 
cooperation has often proven to be problematic (Kumar and van Dissel, 1996). 
This is not necessarily because good intentions and agreements on objectives 
are not reached, but because public sector cooperation is often burdened with 
organizational and political motives, such as legitimacy, accountability, short term 
priorities and public image, which may counteract the cooperation structures and 
related technologies. Such motives are insufficiently known or insufficiently 
anticipated, because they originate from another field than INSPIRE, namely that 
of (inter-) organizational politics. Hence, the willingness and readiness to adapt to 
the INSPIRE agent of change may be obscured by these local and individual 
political-organizational clouds. 
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A number of prior considerations and articles in the Directive may reflect certain 
cooperation assumptions. Table 1 shows a number of such assumptions, which 
may obviously be debated, but the debate is useful to identify certain ambiguities.  
 
Table 1. INSPIRE articles and related political-organizational assumptions 
 
Considerations / Article Implicit assumptions of INSPIRE 
implementation 
Consideration (12) 
Directive should apply to spatial data held 
by or on behalf of public authorities in the 
performance of their public tasks 
The public task is monolithical, and not 
debated. The public authority is 
independent from other public authorities, 
and is free to decide to cooperate if it is in 
their performance interest. Moreover, 
citizens know exactly what to expect from 
the public authority1. 
Consideration (17) 
Network services are necessary for sharing 
spatial data between various levels of 
public authority 
There are no barriers to the network, and 
there is always willingness between 
different public authorities to cooperate  
Art. 4.6 
Directive shall cover spatial data sets held 
by or on behalf of a public authority 
operating at the lowest level of government 
The lowest level of government is 
seamlessly related to higher levels of 
government, and cooperation between the 
different levels is not debated.  
Art. 7.1 
Where organizations have adopted 
relevant standards to ensure 
interoperability or harmonization of spatial 
data sets and services, the standards shall 
be integrated 
The willingness of integration of different 
agencies is not debated, and if agreed is 
non-problematic, and value-free.  
Art.18 
Member States shall ensure that 
appropriate structures and mechanisms are 
designated for coordinating, across the 
different levels of government 
 
The control and command across levels of 
government is not debated. Different levels 
of government are directly controlled 
through higher levels of government, which 
constitute formal cooperation structures. 
Horizontal relations or cooperation 
structures do not exist or can be steered 
and controlled through higher levels of 
government.  
 
                                                 
1 In addition, one could debate the term “public authority” and the extent to which this applies. In the 
Netherlands there are for example 1500 public sector organizations  (Ministries, provinces, 
municipalities, water boards, etc.), but there are between 5000 and 10,000 (dependent on definition 
of “public”) organizations with public goal. Yet, the Directive follows the definitions followed in earlier 
Directives, such as the Public sector information Directive 
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The assumptions do not exactly quote or refer to particular statements in 
INSPIRE related documents, but can be considered part of a critical evaluation 
from another perspective, namely the political-organizational one.  It is obvious 
that some of the assumptions are not consistent. In order to investigate the 
potential range of political-organizational difficulties and counter effects when 
implementing the INSPIRE Directive, this article investigates if and how political-
organizational motives may play a role. In this analysis, the assumption is that 
individual organizations operate in a dynamic arena of interests and influences, 
which have an impact in decisions and behaviour within the cooperation, 
following Bekkers (2007). Similarly, Ciborra and Hanseth (1998) and Orlikowski 
and Robey (1991) argue that the dynamics of implementation of ICT emerges 
and results out of a socio-organizational process of change. If this influence of 
the contact is so crucial, than any external instrument for change may be largely 
affected by this. This brings the main question: How visible is INSPIRE given all 
the other current public sector cooperation efforts with geoICT? Are all aspects 
as non-problematic as the assumptions of Table 1? Or are some aspects only 
occasionally visible, yet obscured by clouds, clouds being in this case local or 
contextual political-organizational motives, which outweigh the INSPIRE 
objectives because of individual organizations having to meet or match local 
interests, motivations or stakes? In this scenario, INSPIRE could only be partially 
implemented. Or, are the INSPIRE objectives completely invisible, meaning that 
empirical data is showing no evidence of INSPIRE objectives being met? 
 
2.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1.  Analytical framework 
 
To evaluate political-organizational properties of geoICT cooperation, such a 
cooperation is considered a system of G2G (Government-to-Government) 
governance. Within such a system, changes in processes and decisions are 
determined by changing or emerging interests and governing rules. Such 
emerging interests and governing rules may be exogenous or endogenous. 
INSPIRE can be considered exogenous, because it was developed outside of the 
arrangements and understanding of existing cooperation. At the same time, it 
may be endogenous, because part of the agreement may be to contribute – and 
thereby aim to influence – INSPIRE rules and outcomes. The data exchange is 
assumed to be part of a set of formal and informal relations between two or more 
organizations, which is guided by a set of formal and informal agreements 
between organizations and between individuals working in these organizations, 
hence a system of governance. The agreements are assumed to be guided by 
resource dependencies, following Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). The most direct 
method for controlling dependence is to control the source of that dependence.  
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To investigate a difference between what should be (INSPIRE) and what is 
(empirical reality), one could take two different standpoints. Either, one could 
pose that INSPIRE is the prescribed objective, and that all that is different from 
the prescription is a barrier or obstacle which need to be removed or reduced, 
until reality meets design. Such a normative approach would then focus on how 
to design a removal of obstacle strategy, assuming that once the obstacles are 
removed the result would show the full objectives. Another approach, and this is 
the approach that is taken in this article, is to zoom in to existing practices and 
trying to unravel (i.e. theorize on) drivers for behaviour within such practices. 
This, more interpretative, approach aims primarily at understanding the interplay 
between policies and empirical realities. An analysis may then show that barriers 
or obstacles may turn out to be at both sides (policy and reality), and interfering in 
reality is considered a continuous, fluid process with sometimes unpredictable 
results. Only if one can understand this process better, one could formulate better 
implementation policies.         
 
Given this fluid process, the research applies an analytical approach, whereby for 
different cases a selected set of political-organizational notions are compared. 
These notions include: authority, interest, command, control and coordination. 
The choice of these notions follows the classification of governance types of 
Bekkers (2007) and relation between structure and agency of Orlikowski (2000). 
Bekkers (2007) uses the above notions in distinguishing hierarchical and process 
management approaches. This approach is useful here also because INSPIRE 
assumes certain forms of hierarchical management, which may not be reflected 
in reality. In addition, Orlikowski (2000) recommends that unravelling the 
enactment of technologies can only be viewed by looking at  recurrent social 
practices, meaning that for example notions of coordination of technology and 
authority structures must be seen in their social-organizational context.    
 
2.2.  Choice of cases 
 
While the National INSPIRE implementation is being guided under the authority 
of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (“VROM” is the 
Dutch abbreviation), VROM is not the only institutional player in the field to 
implement European rules in the field of spatial information. The degree of 
proximity to the rule making and rule implementation of INSPIRE is thus a good 
indicator for case study selection, because one would expect to see the 
differences in effects of politicking and lobbying. The case selection followed the 
definition of case study research by Yin (2003), whereby a case-study inquiry 
“copes with a distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of 
interest than data points”(Yin, 2003). The chosen cases included the cooperation 
of the National Cadastre with Municipalities, the cooperation guiding the National 
Height database, and a local cooperation for the purpose of managing transport 
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information and transport licenses. The cases are different in the degree to which 
INSPIRE objectives play a direct role, or a less direct role. 
 
Table 2. Cases chosen and their relation and relevance to INSPIRE 
 
Case Relation to INSPIRE Other factors which may 
play a role 
1. Cadastre-
municipalities 
The Dutch Cadastre is directly 
participanting in the project teams 
and working groups to implement 
INSPIRE, and in the drafting teams, 
and is directly linked to VROM.  One 
would thus expect a high 
compliance to INSPIRE strategies. 
Municipalities on the other hand are 
an indirect stakeholder, represented 
by different associations. Their 
influence may thus be fragmented.  
There are 443 municipalities, 
different in size, political 
leadership and interests, and 
each having different 
capacities in geoICT. 
Harmonization among 
municipalities is guided 
through different fora, such as 
the association of 
municipalities, but also through 
inter-municipal discussion 
groups.  
2 AHN – 
National Height 
System of the 
Netherlands – 
implemented by 
National Water 
Agency and 
local Water 
boards 
Technology development was 
originally led by a central, national 
authority, close to rule making, and 
possibly therefore  willing to comply 
to (supra)national regulations. Within 
the AHN cooperation there is a 
general aim to strive for base 
registration quality and authority, 
implying also aspiring for INSPIRE 
objectives (i.e. harmonisation of 
geoICT) 
Provinces, as a regional 
authority, are assumed to play 
a coordinating role between 
local water boards and national 
ministries.  Moreover, none of 
the public sector participants 
are hierarchically linked to the 
VROM Ministry.  
3 Sabimos – 
Local dynamic 
public transport 
information 
system – under 
the authority of 
a regional 
government / 
cooperation of 
local authorities 
There is no direct relation to 
INSPIRE related authorities, yet the 
actors require base topographic 
data, exchanged by different 
authorities.  
Role and objectives of 
individual municipalities under 
the cooperation agreement 
may differ. As a result, the 
awareness of (supra)national 
rules, such as INSPIRE, may 
differ significantly.  
 
2.3  Data collection  
 
The collection of data involved the following activities: 
 Exploration of documented and/or reported cases of geoICT cooperation 
in the Netherlands, through a selection of articles in professional journals, 
conference proceedings 
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 Formulation of a descriptive summary of cases, based on characteristics 
of the cases, the degree of institutionalized cooperation, the degrees of 
“closeness” to INSPIRE, access to people working in these cases.  
 Conduct of a workshop with representatives from the cases, 
complemented by a small number of experienced people from the 
academia, local government, and representative bodies. 
 In-depth qualitative semi-structured interviews, followed by a qualitative 
analytical and discourse analysis.  
 
3.  RESULTS  
 
Case 1.  
The various data collecting techniques reveal that the National Cadastre has 
developed several entangled ICT related agreements with municipalities. Data on 
geometry of parcels are collected by the Cadastre and provided to municipalities. 
Data on people are collected by municipalities and shared with the Cadastre for 
the purpose of ownerships, heritance, etc. Data on buildings are the responsibility 
of municipalities, but collected by the Cadastre on behalf of the municipalities. 
Data on addresses are collected by municipalities, but managed by the Cadastre. 
Data on public rights need to be registered by municipalities, but are in fact 
registered in the Cadastre. This entangled set of relationships has made it 
confusing at times to understand who is acting on whose behalf, and who has 
ownership of whose geoICT. As geoICT technology has developed rapidly, there 
have been several rounds of internal ICT reform projects within the Cadastre, 
aimed at lowering cost and improving the ICT architecture. At the same time, 
within municipalities the number of individual geoICT departments and geoICT 
related projects has increased. This has led to various occasions where individual 
municipalities independently created and distributed geo-data, including parcel-
related, independently from the Cadastre.  Last but not least, while the cadastre 
maintains national coverage of parcel-based data, and maintains direct 
negotiation contacts on data exchange with the Association of municipalities for 
example, many municipalities have now joined up for an independent data 
network to assemble and distribute real estate information, called Dataland. The 
data at address level is largely complementary to the Cadastre database at 
parcel level, yet, one could question whether at some point this may develop into 
seriously competing datasets.  
 
Case 2. 
The collection and distribution of national height data of the Netherlands was 
initially organized through an agreement between three parties, namely the public 
water department (RWS) – under the ministry of housing, planning and 
environment, the union of water boards UWV(on behalf of the water boards), and 
the inter-provincial consultative body IPO (on behalf of the provinces).  Through a 
first covenant (in 1997) between these parties, a steering committee was 
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established, which would be responsible for daily management. This steering 
committee consisted of representatives from all parties. The steering committee 
had the task to subcontract the height data acquisition. In the course of this 
process, the member parties started to realize that the actual work was largely 
managed by one party of the steering committee, namely the RWS. They had 
historically the staff capacity to carry out such projects.  
 
In 2003, with the completion of the height data collection approaching a number 
of discussions started for a second, more accurate, round of data collection. New 
technologies of laser scanning could potentially derive much more dense and 
accurate height data, which triggered the interest among most participants. 
Discussions on the renewal of the covenant triggered however a more 
fundamental discussion on responsibilities and roles within the agreement. The 
role of RWS, being both manager and executor was challenged. One of the 
Water boards representatives argued: 
  
At a certain point in time water boards were not always happy with the way the 
data were handled. The RWS were part in both the steering committee and the 
execution of data collection. They were both contractor and managing director. If 
data were delivered by an external party, they were also quality controller. They 
were auditing their own data quality (…) In summary, they had a certain interest 
in all aspects. In such circumstances, discussions at steering level are becoming 
complicated…We (as a steering committee) are not happy with the quality, yet 
the data collector is part of the decision on that.     
 
The roles and the interests of the provinces were considered minimal. On top of 
that, the water boards wanted more influence in the technical processes of geo-
data collection, or in other words, wanted to play their own geoICT card. As a 
result of these conflicts of interest, a new covenant was only signed in 2007, 
between the RWS and the water boards only. Provinces were left out of the 
steering committee, the chairman originated from the water boards, and 
procedures of subcontracting allowed excluding RWS as data collector. 
 
Case 3. 
The project of Sabimos was started rather coincidentally. The technical 
reconstruction of a regional bus station gave a local municipal representative the 
idea to use GPS for more efficient use of the public space needed for such a 
station. If buses were equipped with GPS, then the arrival and departure time 
could be better regulated. With this original idea of compact and dynamic bus 
stations in mind the technical system, based on integration of GIS road data, 
traffic control data and exact positioning of buses was developed under the 
authority of local governments - initially only one municipality, gradually several 
and finally the regional government. The information exchange is managed 
through a set of technical and management agreements between the 
International Journal of Spatial Data Infrastructures Research, 2009, Vol. 4, 117-133 
 125
contributors.  The current information systems incorporate real-time public 
transport data, which are collected in moving buses, and through various 
stationary collection points, such as bus stops, traffic lights, and strips below the 
asphalt. The regional government took up the responsibility for the overall project 
as they claimed authority over regional mobility and transportation. However, in 
the control of the data the functions of the traffic authority (the regional 
government) and the managers of the road (local government) are separated.  As 
far as the data collection is concerned these autonomous authorities were 
maintained.  The overall authority of the technical information system, not 
including the data, was subcontracted to a market party. Table 3 summarizes a 
number of general properties of the cases.  
 
These properties were further investigated through the coding of in-depth 
interviews, using the analytical political-organizational concepts as mentioned 
above.  NVIVO software supported this process, as it has the capability to query 
and link coded statements. This led to findings on authority, interest, command, 
control and coordination, which are summarized in Table 4.  Pfeffer and Salancik, 
(1978) note that:  
 
One is not always in a position to achieve control over dependence through 
acquisition and ownership, however. (...) There are many informal mechanisms 
and semiformal interorganizational linkages that can be employed to coordinate 
the respective interests of various social actors. Social coordination of 
interdependent actors is possible as a means for managing mutual 
interdependence. Behavior, in this instance, is not determined by hierarchical 
mandate but by agreements to behave in certain ways. Some of these 
agreements may be tacit, taking on characteristics of social norms. Other may be 
more or less explicit. 
 
Most of the formal arrangements relating to authority could be verified through 
documents which were made accessible during the research. Perceived interests 
were largely extracted from individual responses, reactions, and expressed 
concerns and hopes. The command and control findings were largely extracted 
from responses which showed certain examples. Findings on coordination were 
extracted from responses relating to how people behaved during joint meetings 
and what type of rhetoric was frequently and consistently used in the 
development of the cooperation. 
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Table 3. General properties of the cases 
 
Properties Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Technology 
used 
Spatial databases 
which can be 
integrated  with GIS 
data and 
functionalities 
 
Sophisticated Laser 
scanning data 
collection resulting 
in data for GIS 
 
Integrated architecture 
of real-time GPS data 
collection, 
Management 
Information systems, 
public transport 
information systems 
and traffic control 
systems 
History and 
results of 
cooperation  
Cooperation is the 
result of an historical 
(some 150 years) 
sequence of land and 
cadastre laws, and 
local government 
laws; until recently, the 
National Cadastre had 
many individual 
agreements with each 
municipality. 
A set of informal 
agreements led to 
two different 
covenants within 
ten years 
 
A number of pilot 
projects led to the 
development under the 
authority of the 
regional government. 
Responsibilities were 
arranged through 
different levels of 
agreements 
 
Key drivers 
observed and 
reported by 
respondents 
Efficiency  Efficiency in 
information 
processes; basic 
registration. 
Political objective of 
local and regional 
mobility  
 
Perceived 
bottlenecks 
How to deal with 
heterogeneity (in 
terms of ICT / 
municipality size / 
resources / political 
priorities) of 
municipalities + 
different roles of 
Cadastre in relation to 
municipalities. 
Efficiency in 
information 
processes; basic 
registration 
 
Integration with other 
political priorities in 
mobility domain (OV – 
card) 
 
Direct effects 
observed in 
governance  
Stronger role of 
Cadastre ; counter 
movement of 
municipalities 
 
Reinvention of 
relations of water 
boards with other 
water managers; 
declining role of 
provinces  
Flexible yet reinforcing 
local authorities 
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A couple of comments can be made. 
 
1) The historical trajectories of cooperation show on the one hand strong, 
controlling institutions, aiming for INSPIRE compliance and their 
implementing actors. This is strongest in the case 1, as exemplified by two 
quotes: 
 
“In general we have a good relation. It is just...as soon as things start to get 
institutionalised...then all of a sudden there is a ministry popping up, like 
VROM. They make....just look at the authentic registrations ...they simply 
state the law...and somehow we have to comply. Cadastre does this, 
municipalities do this. And then, .you work together...communicate 
together...so that we can execute what we can do, and they execute what 
they can do...we prefer to leave the politics to VROM.” 
 
“Municipalities and Cadastre...in our own discipline...there was always 
tension...and this originated from the past...even when they had the same 
professional background...it was the Cadastre who decided and the 
municipalities who had to follow...Well ...there has been quite some change 
recently...” 
 
On the other hand, the flexible structures are less compliant with (supra-) 
national implementing rules and allow for much more flexibility. What both 
have however in common, is an increase in the variety of agreements at 
different levels of each of the contributing parties to the cooperation. Such 
agreements may consist of practical arrangements, or exchange of staff, but 
also of remuneration and exchange of money. An effect of this variety is the 
distributing of authority and responsibility. It opens opportunities to question 
the authority and design or even adopt alternative structures, and find 
legitimacy for this in the availability of other Directives.  
 
2) This development is also reflected in the perceived interests. There is a 
particular need for autonomy, and for autonomous decisions. In relation to 
Case 3 it was frequently mentioned that despite supra-national regulations 
and implementation trajectories, local governments are increasingly involved 
in local principle-agent relationships (i.e. contracting authority vs. contractor 
relations): 
 
The transporter is actually responsible for the ICT. It doesn’t really matter how 
he does it. You have a relation between the government and a private 
contracting party, a commercial party. They have to perform for a certain 
price and a certain quality...In such a scenario, transporter and contracting 
authority cannot just say “let’s handle this together”, no, it’s a hard 
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commercial agreement, you get a bonus if you do well, you get a penalty if 
you don’t 
 
One could argue that such autonomy interests are in conflict with integration 
objectives. However, full integration of the public agencies was perhaps never 
a primary goal of INSPIRE or any other geoICT related policy, even though 
the key drivers for the cooperation (largely focusing on efficiency gains, and 
harmonizing of inter-agency operational work processes) seem to suggest so. 
It is probably the rhetoric of new public management, as also highlighted in 
Homburg (2004), that have an effect on the rhetoric at all levels within 
organizations.  There is obviously the idea that an increase in inter-agency 
efficiency (between public agencies) also leads to an increase in integration 
of those public agencies. Against this point of view one could pose that the 
command, control and coordination is probably not so integrated. In fact, the 
heterogeneity of the cultures, capacities and historical backgrounds of larger 
sets of similar organizations (e.g. municipalities, water boards) leads central 
organizations to apply a strategy one-fits-all (be it with a few exceptions), 
which creates a counter-reaction.  Alternative standards, structures are 
especially generated by consortia of smaller organizations, the water boards 
joining up in inter-agency water boards’ data warehouses, and municipalities 
in inter-agency municipal data warehouses.    
 
3) The historical base out of which geoICT interest originated plays an important 
role in the uptake. In the Case 2 this was exemplified by the direct relation 
between GIS and opportunities for tax collection. A statement from the water 
boards: 
 
Water boards needed to make quite complex calculations for their water tax 
collection. Previously, this was always done manually. If we were to do this 
automatically, using a GIS, we needed the digital height data. So, I had a 
serious interest to participate in such a project. 
 
In addition, local interests and showcases to increase local legitimacy may 
also blur (supra-) national interests, as shown by the opportunism of some 
local government: 
 
“We get direct money from The Hague to execute regional traffic and 
transport policies. Of course there is a discussion, how far do these policies 
reach? (..) So, every time when there is a pilot...we come with our own ideas. 
To give you an example...pay-as-you-drive...is politically hot...where can they 
do a pilot...of course in our municipality...we always have some small road to 
try these things out.” 
 
Table 4 provides a summary of the overall analysis.  
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Table 4. Summary of political-organizational properties per case 
 
Analytical 
concepts Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Type of 
formal 
arrangements  
/ authority 
Law(s), in particular 
those related to 
authentic/base 
registrations; yet, the 
authority is under 
different ministries; 
geoICT guided by few 
Directives  
Covenant ; 
authority under 
different ministries 
and Directives 
Layers of operational 
agreements; single 
authority, yet different 
Directives 
Perceived 
interests 
Use of ICT to maintain 
autonomy 
ICT used to 
increase technical 
& financial 
autonomy by 
lower government 
agencies 
Project is used as a 
showcase of regional 
government to 
citizens and national 
government.  
Command & 
control 
Top-down command 
and control perceived to 
maintain vested 
interests 
De facto strong 
inter-agency 
dependency 
relations 
Local control of 
regional government, 
with principle-agent 
relations towards 
implementing 
agencies 
Coordination 
Efficiency driven, 
following operational 
business objectives of 
maximizing output for 
minimal input, and 
partly INSPIRE 
exchange objectives 
Driven  by national 
public sector 
downsizing 
objectives, and by 
technical expertise 
(data accuracy 
needs) 
Largely driven by the 
management 
information needed 
on regional mobility to 
maintain or change 
local transport 
authorization 
 
4.  DISCUSSION 
 
When reflecting on the assumptions of Table 1, and relating this to the findings as 
given in Table 3 and Table 4, one could find reasonable evidence against the 
assumptions mentioned in Table 1. 
 
The independence of the public task and the public authorities  
The historically prominent roles of the Cadastre and National water agencies – 
directly under a national ministry and closer to the INSPIRE preparation and 
implementation drafting teams - have generated a number of caved-in tactics and 
expectations in the geoICT domain. Technical expertise vested in certain 
organizations, has led to a de facto dominating role in any cooperation that 
involved geoICT. This follows from what both institutional theory and resource 
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dependency theory would predict, namely a fairly static power structure within 
cooperation in relation to technology. 
 
The increase in establishing principle-agent relations over top-down structures 
shows that technological developments in ICT and gradual adoption by various 
organizations of this technology seem to have changed this power structure, or at 
least the perception of power. The creation of the renewed AHN covenant 
specifically used the rhetoric of 2.0 (“two point zero”), to imply technical changes, 
while the major change as compared to version 1.0, was essentially in the 
management and control or the agreement, because the steering committee did 
not have any influence on the technological development. In other words, the 
new geoICT was used to justify certain changes in inter-organizational 
management. Technology acted as an agent of change in the operation and the 
cooperation of a public authority.    
 
Barriers to network, and willingness to cooperate among different public 
authorities 
An important element seems to be the image that is being sent out when 
cooperating. What seems crucial in any perceived success of the cooperation is a 
common view on how the technology is used to communicate with those external 
parties on which it depends. Within Sabimos the perception that the technology 
improved the image by which each of the parties were assessed, also led to the 
belief of funders and constituencies that this was a good thing to do. In the other 
cases, the specific use of the technology and the models was much more 
debated, in view of the explanation that each party had to do towards their 
constituencies.  In all cases, however, the organizational-political rationality (i.e. 
increase of power, legitimacy, autonomy) seems to prevail over the informational 
rationality (as for example reduction of redundancy, integration of systems, etc.). 
The willingness to cooperate is thus strongly related to these political-
organizational factors. 
 
Cooperation between lowest levels of government to higher levels of government 
Local government agencies (both municipalities and water boards) are 
experiencing a stressful load of having to implement many national and 
supranational policies. For those with smaller organizational capacities this 
means having to prioritize task execution. For larger ones, local capacity is 
utilized to influence the outcome of the national regulations, or even to derive 
alternative standardization structures. The article of Coumans (2007) describes 
such an alternative standard. Given this heterogeneity among lower tiers of 
government priorities, harmonization of geoICT may face different types of 
counter-reactions and compliance. If this is responded to by new instruments of 
compliance it may be perceived as a tool to centralize certain authorities which 
were previously decentralised.    
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The values and vested interests of different agencies when integrating 
The implementation of INSPIRE does not come without certain vested interests in 
the geoICT solutions used. Most of decisions on cooperation and integration are 
made through professional and institutionalized associations and representative 
structures. The legitimacy of such structures is at stake if such decisions are not 
met by their constituencies. It is at the same time observed that many (new) GIS 
operators and technologists do not feel sufficiently represented in these 
structures. One could therefore conclude that the rationality of the technological 
decisions thus reflect and re-inforce existing power relations.      
 
The control and command across levels of government and the horizontal 
relations or cooperation structures 
It is no surprise that flexibility in recently started G2G relationships shows more 
examples of flexible solutions and decisions than longer established and fully 
regulated G2G processes. One is seeking the solution of compromise, to 
accommodate for the number of unknowns in the relationship. This compromise 
may not be the most optimal technical solution, but it is the most politically viable 
solution. The cases whereby more regulations exist, confirm this finding. They 
show what is referred to in literature as the “reinforcement hypothesis” (Bekkers 
and Homburg, 2005), ICT tending to extend and reinforce prevailing biases of 
governmental structures and political processes.    
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The analytical findings show that in all cases political-organizational factors 
influence the practice of cooperation with geo-information. Such factors find their 
root in historical practices which were institutionalised, and legacy systems and 
standards which have been dominating. Such findings are partly in accordance to 
what van Loenen and de Jong (2007) found on the role of institutions.  Added to 
these findings is that the counter effects include resistance to what is perceived 
as top-down steered standards, and the construction of local alternative 
standards. The reasons for the emergence of these counter effects can be 
sought in the increasing needs for autonomous decisions at the local level, which 
arise out of increasing influence of constituencies. There seems to be a cyclic 
process ongoing with regards to the acceptance or adherence of standards: A 
provisional hypothesis, when looking at the overall governance of geoICT, is that 
harmonization processes, such as INSPIRE, cause a (chronological) sequence 
of:  
1. Centralization of standards, formalization of data regulations, grouping 
of authorities or even centralizing authorities.   
2. Decentralization (opposition to standards, alternative standards, 
autonomous solutions, flexible solutions) and  
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3. Re-centralization (new associations, new maneuvering). Inter-agency 
cooperation changes from reciprocity relations to more top-down / 
principle-agent relations  
 
In addition, the perceived complexity regarding supra-national standards which 
do not directly relate to local objectives may be a reason why in particular local 
organizations are hesitant to comply. The consequence is that if these political-
organizational motives are not taken into account appropriately, the unintended 
and often hidden counter-effects may overall hamper the implementation of the 
INSPIRE Directive.  
 
Concluding, are there any clouds that we don’t see, or that we try to see with the 
wrong glasses? Yes. These clouds are: (local) policy motives, local politics and 
local interests, and local alternatives to national and supranational programs, 
regulations and designs. The obscuring process is done through lobbying, 
organizational maneuvering, opportunism and generation of alternatives. Parts of 
the clouds are also consisting of money/ financial limitations of local/individual 
organizations, which may lead them to opt for other - perhaps suboptimal – 
solutions and technologies, yet solutions and technologies that fit the local 
organization. Central guidance will then not be preferred by the organization, 
since they heavily depend on other sources and interests. The aspects of 
INSPIRE which are obscured are the assumptions that all organizations are a 
priori willing to cooperate once they understand the benefits of cooperation. Also 
the assumption that they would voluntarily take action to cooperate once a -what 
is felt as a top-down- regulatory and implementation mechanism has been 
installed. Evidence shows that the drivers for action are not necessarily 
generated by the act of regulation and direction, but more so by the protecting or 
generating of certain interests, or by the need to minimize certain internal costs.  
 
To generalize these results it may be necessary to validate them further with 
other cases and more longitudinal qualitative research, more quantitative 
measurement of opinions, and theory building based on both types of research. 
Bekkers and Homburg (2005) have advocated resource dependency theory and 
information ecology theory as suitable frameworks for further research if the 
organizational and political motives that play a major role in the socio-technical 
shaping, as in the cases above. In addition, one could think of using transaction 
cost / institutional theory as candidate frameworks to explain the dynamic 
behavior and the degree of redundant activities that occur as a result of counter-
activities. To evaluate whether the results are typical only for the Netherlands, 
and reflect the particular set of relationships among institutions in this country, or 
the Netherlands’ approach to introducing INSPIRE, one would need to take a 
similar research approach for similar cases in other European countries.    
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